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Getting back on track: control of covid-19 outbreaks in the community
Peter Roderick, Alison Macfarlane, and Allyson M Pollock argue there’s still time to change tack
on the UK’s ad hoc system for covid-19 tracking, testing, and contact tracing
Peter Roderick, 1 Alison Macfarlane, 2 Allyson M Pollock1
Historically, England’s system of communicable
disease control has relied on close cooperation
between local health services andauthorities.General
practitioners, NHS and public health laboratories,
and local public health officers play key roles, backed
by legal notification requirements.
That local system has gradually been eroded over
several decades. (box 1) But instead of prioritising
and rebuilding this system at the start of this
epidemic, the government has created a separate
system which steers patients away from GPs, avoids
local authorities, and relies oncommercial companies
and laboratories to track, test, and contact trace. The
ad hoc parallel system in England has three
components:
Box 1: Erosion of local communicable disease control in
England
At its height, local communicable disease control was
supported by more than 60 national, regional, and local
public health laboratories. The servicewas strengthened
from 1977-2002 by the creation of the Communicable
Disease Surveillance Centre in Colindale.
Erosion began after NHS reorganisation in 1974 and
continued when the Public Health Laboratory Service
Board was abolished in 2003 and its local laboratories
transferred to NHS trusts, at the same time as
communicable disease control was centralised in the
Health Protection Agency.
In 2012, the Health and Social Care Act abolished locally
based bodies in England and carved public health
functions out of the NHS. Public Health England was set
up as an executive agency to fulfil the government’s duty
to protect the public from disease, with only nine
laboratories and eight regional centres. Local authorities
were charged with improving public health. Each local
authority was required, acting jointly with the secretary
of state, to appoint a director of public health, with
responsibility for exercising the authority’s public health
functions.
• Covid-19 primary care programmewhich, until 29
May 2020, did not include information on need to
notify suspected cases to local authorities
• Centralised testing programme that relies heavily
on private companies
• Centrally led contact tracing system that uses
commercial call centres and may in future use a
mobile phone app.
Wequestionwhy the government has created this ad
hoc parallel system when a straightforward, if
weakened, system already existed. In addition, we
are concerned by apparent failings in this parallel
system. The notification system (table 1) seems to
havebeenmishandled from thebeginning, andmany
suspected cases will have been missed as a result.
Outsourced private testing services have been given
thebulk of government business,withno clear public
health standards. There is also a lack of clarity on
where the results are being sent.
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Table 1 | Summary of legal requirements for notifying notifiable diseases in England, Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland
TimescaleNotifiedNotifierData type
England
3 days (written) or, if urgent, orally as soon as
reasonably practicable (for each body)
Proper office of local authority, who then informs Public
Health England
Registered medical practitionerSuspected cases and deaths
7 days (written) or, if urgent, orally as soon as
reasonably practicable
Public Health EnglandOperator of a diagnostic laboratoryConfirmed cases and deaths
Scotland
Health board: 3 days (written) for health board or, if
urgent, orally as soon as reasonably practicable
PHS: no later than the end of the week in which the
information is received or as soon as practicable
afterwards
Health board, which then informs the Common Services
Agency and Public Health Scotland
Registered medical practitionerSuspected cases and deaths
10 days (written), or, if urgent, orally as soon as
reasonably practicable
Health board in whose area the laboratory is situated,
Common Services Agency, and Public Health Scotland
Director of a diagnostic laboratoryConfirmed cases and deaths
Wales
3 days (written), of, if urgent, orally as soon as
reasonably practicable (for each body)
Proper officer of local authority, who then informs Public
Health Wales
Registered medical practitionerSuspected cases and deaths
Local authority: 3 days (written) or, if urgent, orally as
soon as reasonably practicable
PHW: 3 days (written), or, if urgent, orally as soon as
reasonably practicable
Proper officer of local authority, who then informs Public
Health Wales
Operator of a diagnostic laboratoryConfirmed cases and deaths
Northern Ireland
As soon as suspected or confirmedDirector of public health for Northern IrelandMedical practitionerSuspected and confirmed cases and
deaths
Sources: England: The Health Protection (Notification) Regulations 2010, Regulations 2, 3, 4, and 6; Scotland: Public Health etc (Scotland) Act 2008, sections 13, 15, and 16, as amended; Wales: The
Health Protection (Notification) (Wales) Regulations 2010, Regulations 2, 3, 4, and 6; Northern Ireland: Public Health Act (Northern Ireland) 1967, section 2, as amended.
Notification of suspected cases
SARS-CoV-2 was declared a serious and imminent threat to public
health on 10 February 2020,1 but covid-19 was added to the list of
notifiable diseases only on 5 March.2 From the outset, the
notification system was inadequate.
NHS 111 covid-19 call centres were hastily set up. Symptomatic
patients were advised to stay at home and not contact their GPs or
NHS 111 initially,3 and thereafter to contact NHS 111 online. This
will have prevented rapid reporting of suspected cases. A covid-19
clinical assessment service was also set up to receive and possibly
reclassify referrals after NHS 111 triaging, using retired and locum
or sessionalGPs insteadof general practices. It is not knownwhether
registered medical practitioners working in NHS 111 or the
assessment service notified any suspected cases.
NHS guidance4 did not alert GPs to the need to inform local
authorities of suspected cases. It advisedGPs to informPublicHealth
England (PHE) of symptomatic cases and then only in specified
settings or unusual scenarios. The guidance also wrongly implied
that the requirements relating to notifiable diseases apply only to
confirmed cases. These failings were only partially rectified in new
guidance dated 29May 2020.5PHE’s guidancewrongly implies that
local authorities do not need to be notified of suspected cases.6
Centralised and commercially run tests
A public health approach to testing requires a clear purpose,
systematic delivery and data flows, informed participation, quality
assurance, equity, and ethical oversight to build trust. Decisions
should be safeguarded frompolitical and commercial interference.7
The testing programme announced by the government on 4 April
20208 with its “five pillars” falls well short of what is required.
Instead of focusing on increasing capacity in PHE and NHS
laboratories, which report results to PHE through its second
generation surveillance system, the government designated these
laboratories as “pillar 1” for people with a clinical need and health
and care workers and set up a separate, centralised, and
commercially based “pillar 2” for the wider population.
Daily numbers of pillar 1 tests have levelled off, and numbers of
pillar 2 tests now tend to exceed those for pillar 1.9 They include
in-person tests,whichare countedwhensamples are takenat testing
stations at about 50 regional sites and mobile testing units run by
the army. Testing kits posted out to people at home and elsewhere
are counted on dispatch,10 and it is not known how many are
actually used. Numbers have increased dramatically on some
occasions when the government has been trying to reach preset
targets for testing.11
The president of the Institute of Biomedical Science has described
creating this new additional structure as “perverse,” competing
with NHS laboratories and freezing them out.12
Pillar 2 is based on contracts with commercial companies. Very few
appear on the government’s contracts finderwebsite. It seems from
the list of data processors,13 which has changed frequently, that
testers at regional sites are provided by Sodexo and Boots; some
sites are operatedbyDeloitte. Serco, G4S, andLevyprovide facilities
management. Randox provides home testing kits, the logistics for
which are provided by Amazon.
Pillar 2 samples are analysed by the four new “lighthouse labs,”
which involve AstraZeneca and GlaxoSmithKline (box 2), even
though both state that “diagnostic testing is not part of either
company’s core business.”15 16 Randox analyses the samples from
its home test kits, with a contract for £133m (€150m; $165m).17 This
compares with the £86.9m provided to PHE for infectious disease,
surveillance, and outbreakmanagement in 2018-19.18 In all, 67 000
Randox tests are reported to have been sent to the US for analysis
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because of lack of capacity, but 29 500 results were found to be
invalid and needed to be redone.19
Box 2: Lighthouse laboratories14
• Milton Keynes—managed by UK Biocentre, the largest facility in the
UK for storing and processing biological samples. It is the trading
subsidiary of the charity UK Biobank
• Alderley Park is a life science campuswith a dedicated lab for covid-19
analysis led by Medicines Discovery Catapult, which was set up as a
limited company with a grant from Innovate UK to support drug
companies, contract research organisations, and diagnostic
businesses operating in the health sector
• Glasgow—the lab is led by the University of Glasgow at the city’s
Queen Elizabeth University Hospital. It is supported by the Scottish
Government, BioAscent Discovery (a provider of integrated drug
discovery services), and the University of Dundee
Cambridge—acollaborationbetweenAstraZeneca,GSK, and theUniversity
of Cambridge’s Anne McLaren laboratory
According to the government,13 results of non-Randox tests are sent
to the National Pathology Exchange (NPEx) hosted by Calderdale
and Huddersfield NHS Foundation Trust. NPEx links them to test
registration and passes results to NHS Digital and to the NHS
Business Services Authority, which sends results to thosewhohave
been tested. The government also states that Palantir analyses
anonymised data.13
The strategy has three further pillars. Pillar 3 is mass antibody
testing. Pillar 4 is a programme of serology and swab testing for
national surveillance supported by PHE, the Office for National
Statistics, UK Biobank, universities, and other partners. The aim of
Pillar 5 is to build aBritish diagnostics industry,with the short term
aim of supplying the other pillars.
Feedback of results
It is unclearwhathappens tomany test results, inparticularwhether
they are fed back to individual patients’ GPs. Several hundred
thousand tests are reportednot to have been linked toNHS records,
missing confirmed cases.20 There is also no indication whether
results are made available to staff doing local contract tracing. The
chief medical officer for England is reported to have apologised to
local authorities for not having detailed data from tests conducted
by Deloitte.21 It is unclear whether PHE has timely access to test
outcomes.
Further problems have arisen in relation to reporting numbers of
tests and results in national statistics, prompting two letters to the
secretary of state for health and social care from David Norgrove,
chair of the UK Statistics Authority.22 23 The second suggested that
the statistics should enable an understanding of the epidemic and
help manage the testing programme but pointed out that “the
statistics andanalysis serve neither purposewell” and that themain
aim seemed to be to claim the largest possible numbers of tests.
Centralised and commercially run contact tracing
Contact tracing is a local activity. Local authorities know their
community, and tracing requires feet on the ground. But the tracing
programme announced by the secretary of state on 23 April 202024
is centralised, using call centres operated by Serco and other
companies with thousands of newly recruited call handlers. The
programme may not be fully operational until September.25 The
NHS covid-19 app,which had been touted as key to contact tracing,
has now been abandoned.
It is unclear how the contact tracing programme will operate, as
outbreak management plans are yet to be produced. The
government’s guidance does not mention GPs or local directors of
public health.26 It is not knownwhether, how, or towhomsuspected
cases will be notified. Inefficiency, data quality issues, local data
access difficulties, and unnecessary expense are inevitable.
Details such as full postcodes, and age and sex of suspected and
confirmed cases are essential for monitoring outbreaks in a local
authority area and identifying clusters. However, local authorities
do not have live access to this information and are instead sent
aggregated data. This approach, combined with the failures to
require notification of suspected cases and toundertake community
testing, has further hampered outbreak control. Instead of restoring
local data flows, the government is attempting to create apopulation
surveillance system through the new Joint Biosecurity Centre.27The
centrewill receive data fromnumerous sources, includingNHSdata
through the portal of NHSX’s covid-19 data store reference library.
Over 50 datasets are being integrated and harmonised by private
data companies Palantir and Faculty to create a “single source of
truth.”28
Making it work
Immediate steps should be taken to ensure that registered medical
practitioners within NHS 111, the covid-19 assessment service, and
general practicenotify local authorities of suspected cases.Outbreak
management plans should put local directors of public health in
control of contact tracing, coordinated rather than led by PHE. The
capacity of the NHS 111 covid-19 call centres and the assessment
service should be immediately reintegrated into primary care and
practices resourced to resume care. Official advice to those with
covid-19 symptoms should be amended to direct them to contact a
GP or NHS 111.
These steps, however, are remedial. They do not amount to a
coherent and adequate public health response to the epidemic in
England. Such a response requires local authorities, NHS, and PHE
laboratories to be sufficiently resourced to take the lead on contact
tracingand testing, andgeneral practices being resourced to support
patients, under central coordination. Parliament has given the
secretary of state the powers to enable this to happen, and we urge
him to exercise them.
In the longer term, the abysmal response of the government to the
epidemic has served to underline the need for legislation to rebuild
and reintegrate a strong local communicabledisease control system.
Key messages
• England’s established systemof local communicable disease control
has been eroded over several decades
• In response to covid-19 the government has created a parallel system
which steers patients away from GPs and relies on commercial
companies for testing and contact tracing
• Many suspected caseswill have beenmissedbecause ofmishandling
of the notification system
• NHS 111 covid-19 call centres and the covid-19 clinical assessment
service should be reintegrated immediately into primary care and
practices resourced to resume care
• Contact tracing and testing should be led by local authorities and
coordinated nationally
• Englandmust rebuild and reintegrate its local communicable disease
control system
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